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The Cognition and Performance of Resonant
Temporalities in Richard III

Joe Keener, Indiana University-Kokomo

W

ith Shakespeare it’s all about time. Indeed, there are few
playwrights so “time-beguiled as Shakespeare, yet few
are as free from ritual repetitions of the temporal theme”
(Fletcher 70). Shakespeare’s body of work includes 1100 uses of the word
“time,” not including its variants, and 34 of those instances appear in
Richard III, yet the play’s use of linguistic time referents almost always
seems conditional and contingent. The word “if” clocks in at 87 times, “yet”
42, “when” and “then” at 65 and 82 respectively.
It may seem tentative in its linguistic signifiers, but temporality, or,
more accurately, temporalities, are significant in Richard III and its
performance. The times represented in Shakespeare’s play are
concomitant, can be concurrent, and are often conceptualized. The very
first word of the play is “now,” while the penultimate poetic line begins with
“Now civil wounds are stopped.” (5.5.40). Both the signifiers and the
signified of “now” and “time” resonate throughout Richard III yet can be
difficult to delineate due to the intricate nature of the temporal mélange of
the play. Performing, observing, and, to a lesser extent, reading
Shakespeare’s play reveal a multiplicity of times: Historical, Fictive, and
Quotidian.
The analytical endeavor offered here reveals a myriad of ontological
and epistemological concerns informed by distributed cognition, and, in a
sense, creates a far-ranging cognitive inclusivity, as seen in Richard III and
the world around it. Time is in the history books, in stage history, in
productions, on the stage, in the actors, in the audience, and outside of the
theatre, and what ties all of these together, and composes resonant
temporalities, is the act of cognition.
In Shakespeare, Theater, and Time Matthew Wagner argues for a
“temporal thickness,” as if all times are layered into one experience (13),
whereas, coming from a Performance Studies perspective, Jerzy Limon
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asserts that these plays have time streams that flow in variable speeds and
currents and are demarcated by what he calls the “fifth wall” (“Time” 216).
How do humans perceive, much less understand, these intricate matrices
of temporality? Gone are the days of conceptualizing audiences as passive
receivers of plays: just as humans do not inertly take in their cultures or
the world around them, they do not catatonically accept the theatrical
experience and the representations of time therein—theatre is an act of
cognition. Cognition is not just neuronal impulses and synaptic strength,
not just all in the head, but a part of a system. “Distributed,” “Embodied,”
“Situated,” “Extended,” and “Socially and Culturally Distributed” are
different ways cognition has been theorized, but their difference is in
degree, not kind. Some terms stress information storage in matter, such as
costumes or lighting, whereas others emphasize shared cognition outside
of the isolated brain. What ties all of these ideas together is that, as
Lawrence Shapiro asserts in Embodied Cognition, “Cognition emerges
from dynamical interactions among the brain, body, and world” (125). A
recent article in the journal Cognitive Systems Research adds that
“individual cognition is supported by, and is mutually co-constructed by
larger social, institutional, normative, political, technological, and cultural
systems and practices” (Cash 61). The brain, the culture of the spectator,
the theatre, the play, the artist, the culture of the playwright, every element
of production, are all part of a Mobius strip of distributed cognition, which
is a neuronal impulse repeating itself across the varied constituents of that
distribution.
David Herman aspires to draw all of these ways of categorizing
cognitive systems into what he sees as “the nexus of brain, body, and
environment (or world), ‘which he dubs the “mind’ ” (165). The term is
useful. Still, considering that cognition is an act beyond our individual
brains, how does all of this theorizing help spectators deal with the “fifth
wall” or “temporal thickness” of all the time streams flowing through a
production of Richard III? In her book Shakespeare Neuroplay, Amy Cook
considers Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT), contending that “Blends are
constructions of meaning based on the projection of information from two
or more input spaces to a blended space, such that the blended meaning
contains information and structure from more than one space” (11). Cook
coins the term “neuroplay” for the neurological transaction between
performer and spectator, “performed and received, staged and housed, you
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and me, at the same time” (153). Part of this theatrical neuroplay is the
cognitive blend of resonant temporalities in plays like Richard III.
Historical, Fictive, or Quotidian time in Shakespeare’s play is a cognitive
blend distributed across an entire system of cognition. For the ease of
discussion, these three temporalities can be scrutinized individually, but
they exist contemporaneously in the cognitive blend of the play. Historical
time can mean everything, both real and fictive, that took place before the
commencement of the play—it’s the tense of the past. Fictive time is the
temporal setting of the play in which the characters and occurrences exist,
a sort of present lie in that it progresses in narrative time, not the time it
takes the actors to complete the play. The play’s present is a lie in the sense
that it differs from the audience’s present. Quotidian time would be the
“real” time as experienced by actors, spectators, and the larger world
around them.
Like all of Shakespeare’s history plays, Richard III’s Historical time
seems paradoxically cohesive and fragmented at the same time. The real
world historical people and events that transpired long before the play was
even written represent one stream of Historical time, while the history of
theatrical production and spectatorship offers two other manifestations.
One could also argue there are even Historical-Fictive or HistoricalQuotidian times, as the play unfolds in the time of its setting, making its
fictions historical through continued movement within that time, and the
Quotidian, real world around it, constantly making the present turn into
history, the hour of performance later than when first begun. Little wonder
Majorie Garber posits in Shakespeare After All that productions of the
history plays tend to conflate times (314). To extend and complement
Garber’s assertion, such is the very nature of the cognition of time in the
theatre that it is nearly impossible to not conflate times as they resonate in
this highly particularized environment.
From the onset of the play, Richard does his best to bring time into
the present when he opens with “Now is the winter of our discontent/ Made
glorious summer by this son of York” (1.1-2), but by the second act, the
First Citizen notes: “So stood the state when Henry the Sixth/ Was crowned
in Paris but at nine months old” (2.3.16-18). The play is haunted by the
past, and not just the real-world, historical episodes, but Shakespeare’s
Henry the Sixth trilogy of history plays, which dramatizes the War of the
Roses. The Plantagenet and Lancastrian thirty-two year struggle for the
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throne left an indelible mark on the English history. Many in Shakespeare’s
audience, and even audiences today, would be aware of both the historical
record and Shakespeare’s previous first plays, the popular Henry the Sixth
trilogy, written and performed in 1590-1592. Richard III, written in 15931594, chronologically followed, not unlike its historical counterpart. Both
the historical and performance record would connect these plays and
events for audiences.
Limon likens offstage Historical time to smaller events in the play’s
narrative that are not viewed by the audience, seeing them as part of a
framework that all belongs to what he calls “diegetic time,” or the totality
of the time emanating from the play itself, not from some outside source
(Chemistry 117). Regardless of its status as diegetic or not, Historical time
is about memory, and an important part of memory is the cognitive
capacity to track time, to compare and contrast. In Behavioral and Brain
Sciences Corballis and Suddendorf postulate that “tracking of the passage
of time typically activates the right hemispheric dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, which is also implicated in working memory which, along with
judging temporal distance, may depend on the same dopamine-modulated
neuronal system” (309). This cognitive relationship also has implications
for the perception of the future: “Brain imaging has shown that both
remembering the past and imagining the future are associated with frontal
and temporal lobe activity, although there are specific areas in the frontal
pole and medial temporal lobes that are more involved with the future than
with the past” (Corballis 302). These processes are situated within Richard
III, the production, actors, stage, theater, and the world.
One of Shakespeare’s palpable images of the evocation of the past in
Richard III are buildings, such as the Tower and Pontefract Castle. Prince
Edward asks Buckingham if Julius Caesar had built the tower, which he
affirms but also notes that “succeeding ages have re-edified” (3.1.68-71).
Queen Margaret refers to the tower in a past tense when she accuses
Richard with, “Thou kill’dst my husband Henry in the Tower” (1.3.119)
while Rivers harkens back to an earlier time, stating to the other doomed
nobles that “Within the guilty closure of these walls/ Richard the Second
here hacked to death” (3.1.11-12). These representations are signifiers that
contain information; in these instances, despite the existence of both the
Fictive and Quotidian time, among the information is Historic time,
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smuggled into a system of Extended Cognition that does indeed seem like
“temporal thickness.”
Perhaps another view of how this act of cognition works is what Alan
Richardson calls a “memory imagination system.” Neuroscientific
accounts of said system see it as “looking backward and forward in time—
the ‘Janus Hypothesis’” and it “tends to emphasize the utility of such an
arrangement, which provides an ‘adaptive’ rationale for the otherwise
perplexing fragility of episodic memory” (234). Richard constantly exerts
great effort to dictate the substance of this Janus Hypothesis, creating both
the backward and forward looking when he tells Queen Margaret and
Rivers “Let me put in your minds, if you forget,/ What you have been ere
this, and what you are;/ Withal, what I have been, and what I am” (1.3.131133). Of all of Richard’s notorious ambitions, the struggle to control time
and the other characters’ cognition of it is perhaps his most audacious and
quixotic. One could argue that Richard strives to maintain this kind of
domination of the audience too, as we spend more time alone, by far, with
Richard than any other character. In fact, Richard looms large in the body
of Shakespeare’s works, as the only bigger part in all of the plays is Hamlet.
Richard’s first speech is 44 lines long, 42 of those spoken solus, on the
stage. Thus, Richard often has the audience’s ear with little to no
interruption. Even when he admits he’s a villain, Richard offers
justification of how he was “Cheated of feature by dissembling Nature”
(1.1.19) his Iagoian impulses wrapped in self-justification and suggestion.
Richard attempts to dictate the Historic and, in a way, the Quotidian time,
both past and present, with an eye toward the future.
The same kind of endeavor exists between the actors, the stage, and
the audience. Peter Brook once wrote, “So it is that Shakespeare succeeded
where no one has succeeded before or since in writing plays that pass
through many stages of consciousness” (88). While his Shakespearean
exclusivity may be questionable, his main assertion holds true for not only
characters, but for actors and audiences. After all, “Drama as Shakespeare
contrived it lived in performance, not in publication; and, as such, it
continually stimulated, and relied on, the cognition of spectators. On a
virtually bare stage, Shakespeare’s collaborators were not only his fellow
players but the playgoers, who provides reactions to what is both seen on
the stage and what is referred to but not necessarily seen there. Cognitive
responses to a play could always be seeded, but their outcome was not
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certain” (Kinney 130). Distributed cognition, by its very nature, can only
be consistent in the most general of ways. Artists can be sure of their
intended spectators’ cognitive responses, but, as each audience has a
distinct makeup, in a world full of varying spectator cognitive patterns,
they will have to settle for the likelihood that audiences will complete their
part of the distributed cognition system in the anticipated way.
One reason for this lack of certainty is perception and cognition.
Perception “involves ‘explaining away’ the driving (incoming) sensory
signal by matching it with a cascade of predictions pitched at a variety of
spatial and temporal scales. These predictions reflect what the [cognitive]
system already knows about the world (including the body) and the
uncertainties associated with its own processing. Perception here becomes
‘theory-laden’ in at least one (rather specific) sense: what we perceive
depends heavily upon a set of priors….that the brain brings to bear in its
attempt to predict the current sensory signal” (Clark 187, insert mine). The
mammalian brain is, in a sense, associative, and deals with incoming
stimuli, such as a line in a play, by using prior stimulations to create
predictions already known by the brain. To put an even finer point on it,
“When two stimuli are delivered within a short interval, the response to the
second stimulus can be either enhanced or depressed relative to the
response to the first stimulus…Whether a synapse exhibits paired pulse
facilitation or depression depends on the recent history of activation of that
synapse” (Citri 18-19). This phenomenon is a sort of “neuronal learning”
that reveals the plasticity of the mammalian brain and accounts for the
individuality of audience members’ responses to the performance.
Every human being does not have the exact same priors, or the
same history of synaptic response to previous neuronal firings, so it stands
to reason that audiences would not process and therefore perceive any
stimuli, much less something as complex as a play or the experience of
time, in exactly the same way. Fictive time, sometimes called Literary time,
works in this same way, and is especially resonant in Richard III.
Shakespeare’s play and its characters are obsessed with Fictive time,
constantly asking for the “O’clock.” Hastings queries “What is the o’clock,”
and Buckingham declares “I go, and towards three or four o’clock.” Even
Richard gets into these requests for the appropriate Fictive time, asking
“Ay, what’s the o’clock,” and, after being told it is ten offers “Well, let it
strike” (3.2.4, 3.6.101, 4.2.110-111). Later in the play he asks Catesby for the
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“o’clock before the final battle starts, as “The clock striketh,” seeing in it
and the movement of the sun as a harbinger of doom (5.3.46, 5.3.277). All
of these demands are endeavoring to impress order on Fictive time,
particularly in the last two acts of the play, as the audience can almost feel
time running out for Richard, if not for the play and the theatrical
experience.
How the audience deals with Fictive time is as equally fluid as the
characters on stage. In fact, “If, in the audience, we are told, either literally
in dialogue or through any other means of communication that the theatre
has at its disposal, that a night, or two days, or a year has passed while the
dimming and raising of the stage lights blinked our eyes for us, we can
accept it as a given. In this respect, the passage of time in the theatre is
literary—we, the audience, project ourselves into a fictive world that is
represented before us” (Wagner 24). The repetition of these “projections,”
on a neuronal level, leads to synaptic plasticity, which, “specifically refers
to activity-dependent modification of the strength or efficacy of synaptic
transmission at preexisting synapses, and for over a century has been
proposed to play a central role in the capacity of the brain to incorporate
transient experiences into persistent memory traces. Synaptic plasticity is
also thought to play key roles in the early development of neural circuitry”
(Citri 18). Perceiving and processing Fictive time could lead to a cognitive
plasticity not available to merely Quotidian time, although the two are
hardly divorced from each other.
When Richard divulges “plots have I laid,” or Edward dies far from
the audience’s presence or present, or Hastings’ decapitation is only seen
and comprehended through Lovell and Ratcliff returning with his head in
hand, it is intimated that there is a world offstage that remains part of the
Fictive world and, therefore, of its time. While many tend to think of this
world in spatial terms, where does it exist in time? “Many metaphors of
time are based on space and the dynamics of movement in space. The
conceptualization of time is thus in some way derived from the perception
of movement in space” (Droit-Volet 494). As the audience watches actors
move to and from these implied spaces/times in the wings of the theatre,
our experience of that movement resolves itself into resonant times. Bruce
McConachie explains the audience’s ability to create narrative cohesion out
of these different times and spaces as “the part-whole primitive,” which
“helps audiences to incorporate more and longer strands of these causal
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sequences into a general narrative schema; spectators recognize that one
strand is part of a longer whole and that this whole, and so on, becomes a
part of an even larger whole, and so on, as they elaborate a nested hierarchy
of incidents to shape their narrative comprehension” (Engaging 166). The
time of the stage joins with the implied time offstage to create a temporal
whole. Cognitive Blending Theory would support McConachie while
realizing that this part/whole primitive is strictly an act of distributed
cognition, as stated above, a neuronal impulse repeating itself across the
varied constituents of that distribution.
Quotidian and Fictive time are so concomitant as to regularly make
parsing the two difficult. For example, there are many instances in Richard
III where characters speak asides. In the company of Richard, Queen
Margaret offers the aside “A murd’rous villain, and so still thou art”
(1.3.134), or in the presence of Buckingham and Prince Edward, Richard,
in reference to the young prince, ghoulishly utters as an aside “So wise, so
young, they say, do never live long” (3.1.79). Does the speaker of the aside
exist in the same time as those unable to hear? In the Fictive time, it seems
they do not, as if all the characters freeze, or, at the very least, turn away,
but in Quotidian time, or real time, the utterance unfolds in that time
contemporaneously with the Fictive. One could treat the asides as
characters merely muttering under their breaths, but it would still be a
duration that the other characters would endure, muddying the waters of
the Fictive and Quotidian. These asides are infused with curses, or
predictions of the future, an important part of the Fictive time. Curses exist
in Richard III as wishful prognostications of the future, and Shakespeare
has an affinity for writing curses that have already been fulfilled in
Historical time, never more so than in Richard III.
The play’s near obsession with the art of prophecy, and characters
cursing each other’s futures, also makes these two times intertwine. Queen
Margaret’s execration of Elizabeth that “Long mayest thou live to wail thy
children’s death,” is rebuffed but followed by her rejoinder “O, but
remember this another day,/ When he shall split thy very heart with
sorrow./ And say poor Margaret is a prophetess” (1.3.299-301) or when the
Duchess of York curses Richard with “Bloody thou are, bloody will be thy
end” (4.4.195), there is a sense of fait accompli in seemingly all possible
times on the stage. The curses are eventually made manifest in the Fictive
World and Time of the play, with Elizabeth losing everything and Richard
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offering “My Kingdom for a horse!” before he is slain by Richmond (5.4.13).
At the same time, these events come to pass during “the two hours traffic
of our stage” (Romeo 1.1.12), played out in the real time of the theatrical
experience. Both the Fictive and Quotidian times are vital parts of the
distributed cognition that makes up the world of the theatre. Limon posits
that “the spectator can be in or out of the resultant blend, and can also ‘live
in the blend,’ often below the level of consciousness” (Chemistry 14). It is
the “in and out” that is difficult for the artist to always foresee, particularly
as audience members do not always move between the two in conscious,
much less consistent, ways. Playwrights and other theatrical artists must
depend on varied blended spaces that live within the possibility of the
grammar of the theatre, or its unique customs and traditions, such as the
relationship between the audience and the stage/actors/language/etc. to
make meaning.
Performance practices help create these cognitive blends, as “they
are historically, culturally, socially, and aesthetically contingent behaviors
that remake the text, constitute the event, mediate our participation in its
performance and sometimes, incidentally, convey an effect of
representation” (Worthen 145). However, distributed cognition works
both ways, as the audience “engages in a conceptual process designed to
transform the stage and its activities into a structured fiction” (Garner
XVII). Shakespeare’s texts are also part of this distribution that cognitively
helps humans make meaning, but Mary Crane Thomas reminds us
“Meaning is not just the product of an exterior system of signs but is
fundamentally structured by human cognitive processes….meanings that
are determined by the interaction of the physical world, culture, and these
human cognitive systems” (21, 12). In other words, Herman’s idea of the
mind, as discussed above.
The time between acts and scenes, or the “dream time” when ghosts
walk the earth, add to this discussion of cognition and Richard III. The
ghosts of Prince Edward, Henry the Sixth, Clarence, Rivers, Grey, and
Vaughn all enter severally and speak to Richard and Richmond, offering
curses and praise for the following day, but these figures are radical
members of the past of the play, dragged by seemingly some greater force
than Shakespeare’s quill. Is this Fictive time? Quotidian? Neither? Both?
This uncertainty is, no doubt, how Shakespeare, looking through the lens
of Historical time, problematizes the idea of the other two times, hence the
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label of “supernatural,” with its inability to fit neatly into anything other
than a “dream time.” Both supernatural and dream time imply their
opposites, a sort of natural, waking time, which are really just synonyms
for Quotidian time, another part of the temporal thickness that exists in
the attempt to tell a story from the theatrical stage.
In one such story, Richard III, Queen Elizabeth admonishes
Richard with “An honest tale speeds best when plainly told” (4.4.361). The
argument in this paper is that telling stories is never so plain or simple,
especially when it comes to resonant temporalities and how they play out
not only on the stage but in the audience’s real life. Theatre is an extended,
heightened, and complicated version of the temporalities outside the
confines of its performative space. Richard III reveals how plays, the
theatre, actors, productions, the brain, memory, blended spaces, image
schemas, and various forms of time are all integral to the theatre-going
experience and the distributed cognition used therein..
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